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Electoral reform in local
government: alternative
systems and key issues
The Government plans a full modernisation of local government, including
annual elections and a stronger scrutiny role for elected representatives.
Such a programme must also consider reform options which improve the
match between votes and seats, revitalise local electoral dynamics and
strengthen links between councillors and constituents.  This research, by
Patrick Dunleavy and Helen Margetts, investigates a key possibility for such
an agenda: changing the local electoral system. The researchers simulated
local elections under five alternative electoral systems to first-past-the-post.
Key findings were:
The Alternative Vote or the Supplementary Vote would guarantee that all
councillors had majority support in their wards and would minimise
boundary changes. But these systems would not improve the match between
parties’ vote shares and seat shares. They would also continue to treat
opposition parties unfairly in areas dominated by one party.
List Proportional Representation would deliver roughly proportional
results but would tend to favour large parties over smaller ones. The system
would require that councillors are elected in larger wards of five or six
members. If full annual elections are introduced, 15 to 18 member wards
would be needed.
The Single Transferable Vote would also require large wards and pose
severe problems for annual elections. The system would generally produce
proportional outcomes, but in some cases the simulations produced
apparently anomalous results. The system would maximise voter choice,
recording multiple preferences within and across parties.
The Additional Member System was found to be the most consistently
proportionate system, delivering a good match between parties’ vote shares
and their numbers of councillors across all elections analysed. The system
would encourage effective opposition and maintain local links.
The researchers conclude that electoral reform in local government is feasible
with all of these systems. But the proposed introduction of annual elections
will cause difficulties in implementing any of the alternative electoral
systems.  
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To investigate how alternative electoral systems
would work under different local conditions across
England, the researchers re-analysed two 1990s
elections in 12 localities, covering major cities, large
towns, London boroughs, county councils and rural
districts This resulted in simulated outcomes for 96
different elections. 
The five systems examined were:
• The Supplementary Vote (SV), where voters mark
an X in a first preference column against their
preferred candidate’s name, and another X in a
second preference column. First preferences are
counted, and any one candidate with majority
support is elected straightaway. If no one has
majority support, then only the top two
candidates stay in the race. All other candidates
are eliminated, and their voters’ second
preferences examined. Any second preferences for
the two top candidates are added to their first
preference piles. Whoever has the most votes wins.
SV expands voters’ choice because supporters of
minority parties can still vote honestly on their
first preferences, but can also influence the
outcome with their second vote.
• Under the Alternative Vote system (AV), voters
indicate a preference for as many candidates (or
parties) as they choose by numbering them 1, 2, 3
and so on. Again, a candidate with majority
support is elected immediately. If no one has over
50 per cent of first preference votes, AV eliminates
candidates one at a time from the bottom and
reallocates their voters’ subsequent preferences
amongst remaining candidates. This continues
until either one candidate has a majority of valid
votes or there are only two candidates left, when
the leading one wins.
• The Additional Member System (AMS) combines
a proportion of half or more representatives
elected by first-past-the-post (FPTP) in local
constituencies, with an equal or smaller number of
‘top-up’ representatives elected via a party-list
system for larger areas. Current versions of AMS
used in Scotland, Wales and London have a
majority of locally elected members (66 per cent in
Wales, 57 per cent in Scotland). Under AMS, voters
get a two-part ballot paper. In the first section,
voters mark a first preference candidate (and
party) with a single X. The second section gives a
list of candidates for each party and voters mark a
single X for their preferred party. Local votes are
counted first; the party with most votes there wins
each local seat, as with FPTP. Then the top-up
seats are allocated, bringing each party’s share of
seats into line with its share of votes. This system
aims to compensate parties winning numerous
votes but no seats in local contests.
• In List Proportional Representation (List PR)
parties field a ‘list’ of candidates and voters get a
simple ballot paper on which they mark a single X
for their preferred party. Votes are counted and
each party’s vote is matched against a quota to see
which should win the first seat; this goes to the
party most over the quota, say party A. Then a
quota of votes is removed from party A’s vote
share. The party which now has most votes over
the quota is allocated the second seat. This process
continues until all seats are allocated or until no
party can come up to the quota. If a seat remains,
under any British version of AMS it is allocated
using the ‘d’Hondt system’ which tends to favour
large parties (unlike some European countries’ List
PR systems which boost smaller parties’ chances of
winning the last seat).
• The Single Transferable Vote (STV) uses a more
complex ballot paper listing all candidates for each
party (around 20 names in England for a five-
member constituency). Voters can cast multiple
votes. They number candidates 1, 2, 3 etc. in order
of preference, showing as many choices as they
like and picking candidates in any order within a
party or across different parties. At the seat
allocation stage, a quota is defined and any
candidate with enough personal votes to come up
to quota is elected. Then the system switches to
the AV method of eliminating bottom candidates
and redistributing their voters’ second preferences
to remaining candidates until all seats are filled.
STV encourages voters to pick the best
representatives without regard to party lines -
allowing voters to take account of additional
factors such as sex, race or a record of local service.
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The researchers compared the performance of these
systems across criteria that would be applied to any
programme of reform aiming to strengthen local
legitimacy. In every case, results were compared with
actual election results under the current system, first-
past-the-post (FPTP), where voters choose a single
candidate and party by marking an X on the ballot
paper and the candidate with the most votes wins.
Securing proportional outcomes
FPTP produces highly disproportional outcomes
which favour large parties and encourage one-party
dominance. Political scientists summarise systems’
performance on such over- or under-representation
using a measure called Deviation from
Proportionality (DV).  The higher an electoral
system's DV score for a given election, the greater the
mismatch between votes won and seats awarded for
the parties contesting the election. The maximum DV
score possible is around 50 per cent.
Across the elections analysed, the median DV
score for first-past-the-post was 22 per cent, with
scores ranging from 5 per cent to 42 per cent (the
latter occurred in Newham in 1998 where Labour
won every council seat with 58 per cent of votes). The
middle half of the data showed DV scores between 66
and 30 per cent - all very high values. 
Under the Supplementary Vote and Alternative
Vote systems there was little change, with the median
DV score slightly lower at 16 per cent. But SV and AV
increased disproportionality in four elections. In
Richmond, for example, the Liberal Democrats are
already heavily over-represented under FPTP. Under
SV or AV, if many Labour and Conservative voters
gave second preferences to the Liberal Democrats,
over-representation would rise sharply to over 50 per
cent.
All the other three systems would make a major
difference to proportionality. For both List PR and
STV the average DV score would drop from 22 per
cent under FPTP to 7 per cent. The majority of data
for both systems is between 6 and 12 per cent, again
sharply lower. Under both List PR and STV, all but
three elections yielded scores of 13 per cent or less.
But the best-performing system in terms of
proportionality was clearly AMS, with a median DV
score of just 3 per cent and the middle half of data
lying between 2 and 4 per cent. Only one result
yielded a DV score above 5 per cent. The system
performed proportionally under all the diverse
conditions tested.
Producing effective opposition 
Another reason for reform is to stop one-party
dominance hindering effective opposition. Under
FPTP, a third of the elections produced results where
70 per cent of the council came from a single party.
In a sixth of cases, the leading party controlled 90 per
cent of the council. Under AV or SV this problem got
worse, with the majority party controlling over 90 per
cent of the council in a quarter of cases. Under List
PR, two councils passed the 70 per cent level but
none gained over 90 per cent. Under both STV and
AMS, none of the elections would have produced a
council where one party held even 70 per cent of
seats. The three proportional systems would make a
major contribution to producing situations where
effective opposition was feasible everywhere across
the country.
Local accountability
An important aspect of electoral system change is the
impact on the existing pattern of wards, in particular
the links between councillors and constituents. The
system also needs to be compatible with the planned
universal annual elections, whereby all wards would
have a third of councillors elected every year for three
years. Currently, local authorities run either rotating
annual elections or four-yearly elections of the whole
council. Even for FPTP, full annual elections will
require all local authorities to adopt standard three-
member wards.
Under AV or SV, the ward links between
councillors and citizens would remain exactly the
same as now. If full annual elections across all wards
were introduced, AV and SV would require three-
member wards, as for first-past-the-post. If current
elections were retained, however, then the existing
multi-member wards in local authorities would have
to be split into single-member areas - because neither
SV nor AV can operate with multiple seats to fill.
Under AMS, there are two types of local link: the
local seat and the top-up area. Most British councils
are too large for the top-up area to cover the whole
authority without creating the possibility of minority
parties winning seats (with a 50-seat council a
borough-wide top-up area would imply that any
party with 2 per cent of votes would gain a seat).
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Total seats in each top-up area should not be less
than about 15 seats nor exceed 20-25 seats. So small
councils with 30-40 seats would need two top-up
areas; large councils with 70-90 seats might need
four. The advantage of such arrangements is that top-
up areas would themselves be quite local. With
annual elections in all wards, AMS would require
three-member wards where only one member was
elected each year, larger than the three-member
wards under FPTP to allow for the top-up seats.
STV and List PR both necessitate an increase in
ward size, requiring multi-member wards with five or
six councillors. In areas that currently have a mixture
of two- and three-member wards, pairing existing
areas would be sufficient. However, full annual
elections would destroy the notion of local links
between councillors and constituents. The only way
these systems could operate would be in very large
wards with at least 15 councillors, five of which
would be elected in each election year. A small
council with 40 members might have just two wards
and a large council with 90 members would have
only six.
Thresholds for minor parties to secure
seats
Under FPTP there is usually a high threshold for
parties to begin winning council seats, with those
winning less than around 20 per cent of the votes
being under-represented. AV and SV leave this high
‘effective threshold’ exactly the same.
Under AMS, the increased size of local wards
makes it harder for smaller parties to win local seats.
However, top-up seats provide the route to
representation. With five local seats and five top-up
seats, any party with ten per cent support will
certainly win a seat. In seven out of twenty elections
studied, minor parties won more seats under AMS
than under FPTP.
For List PR and STV, the electoral threshold will
be around 100 per cent divided by the number of
seats in multi-member wards. So in five-member
wards a party would need 20 per cent support in
order to be guaranteed a seat. The threshold is much
the same as FPTP. Both systems would cause
problems for Independents who would find it
difficult to establish reputations across larger wards.
Under List PR, Independents would have to agree to
form a list across localities and decide upon a
ranking.
About the study
Analysis was based on election results in 12 localities
for two elections, one in the early 1990s and one in
the mid-1990s. The 12 authorities were chosen to
illustrate a number of different institutional and
political settings, rather than a representative sample
of all local authorities in England. Therefore, the data
are intended to facilitate comparison between
electoral systems rather than provide a full picture of
the country. The full report contains data tables for
all elections simulated, as well as summary tables,
detailed consideration of implementation issues and
a discussion of the possible systems for electing
executive mayors.
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The full report, Proportional representation for local
government: An analysis by Patrick Dunleavy and
Helen Margetts is published for the Foundation by YPS
(ISBN 1 899987 97 5, price £13.95 plus £2 p&p). 
For further information on the study, contact
Professor Patrick Dunleavy, Department of
Government, London School of Economics, Houghton
Street, London WC2A 2AE, Tel: 0171 955 7178, Fax:
0171 831 1707, e-mail: P.Dunleavy@lse.ac.uk, or 
Dr Helen Margetts, School of Public Policy, University
College London, 29/30 Tavistock Square, London
WC1E 9EZ, Tel: 0171 504 4980, Fax: 0171 504 4969,
e-mail: H.Margetts@ucl.ac.uk.
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